序言 Prologue 删除不了的真相 Truth Cannot Be Deleted

2026年3月15日至3月25日，我的微信公众号"AI-security-innora"共9篇安全研究文章被分三波强制删除。 Between March 15 and March 25, 2026, a total of 9 security research articles were force-deleted in three waves from my WeChat Official Account "AI-security-innora."

删除通知原文："接相关投诉，以下文章被判断为违反《中华人民共和国网络安全法》，已删除。"处理依据："相关法律法规"。没有指明具体条款。没有指明投诉方。没有申诉渠道。 The exact wording of the deletion notice: "Received related complaint. The following article has been determined to violate the Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China and has been deleted." Basis: "related laws and regulations." No specific article. No identified complainant. No appeal channel.

通知只说了"接相关投诉"——没有指明投诉方是谁。没有案件编号。没有联系方式。连你被谁告了都不告诉你。 The notice only said "received related complaint" — without identifying who filed it. No case number. No contact information. They do not even tell you who accused you.

删除通知截图（原始证据） Deletion Notice Screenshots (Original Evidence)

微信公众平台安全助手通知 — 文章1和2 WeChat Platform Safety Assistant — Articles 1 and 2

微信公众平台安全助手通知 — 文章3和4 WeChat Platform Safety Assistant — Articles 3 and 4

第一次用"名誉侵权"——失败。第二次换"网络安全法"——成功。 First attempt using "reputation infringement" — failed. Second attempt invoking "Cybersecurity Law" — succeeded.

这不是法律的胜利。这是法律被武器化的证据。 This is not a victory of law. This is evidence of law being weaponized.

第一部分 Part 1 事实：17个漏洞、308条日志、42张截图 The Facts — 17 Vulnerabilities, 308 Logs, 42 Screenshots

2026年2月25日至3月7日，我向一个日活超过10亿用户的国民级支付应用提交了4轮安全漏洞报告，发现17个安全漏洞，CVSS评分从7.4到9.3。核心发现是一条完整的攻击链： Between February 25 and March 7, 2026, I submitted four rounds of vulnerability reports to a payment application with over 1 billion daily active users. I identified 17 security vulnerabilities with CVSS scores ranging from 7.4 to 9.3. The core finding was a complete attack chain:

• 静默窃取GPS坐标（8.81米精度，无弹窗授权）Silent GPS theft (8.81m accuracy, no permission dialog)
• 提取完整设备指纹（30+字段）Full device fingerprint extraction (30+ fields)
• 唤起支付收银台（iOS tradePay API）Invoke payment checkout (iOS tradePay API)
• 预填转账页面（攻击者账号+金额）Pre-fill transfer page (attacker's account + amount)
• 蠕虫式传播（自动向微信/QQ/钉钉分享恶意链接）Worm-like propagation (auto-share to WeChat/QQ/DingTalk)

这些不是理论推测。308条服务器交互日志记录了每一次数据外传。42张全链路截图标记了每个关键步骤。3台设备在3个国家完成了独立复现——新西兰奥克兰的Samsung S25 Ultra、马来西亚槟城的Redmi、以及厂商自家安全负责人在杭州总部使用的iPhone 16 Pro。 These are not theoretical claims. 308 server interaction logs document every data exfiltration event. 42 full-chain screenshots mark each critical step. 3 devices across 3 countries independently reproduced the findings — a Samsung S25 Ultra in Auckland, New Zealand; a Redmi in Penang, Malaysia; and the vendor's own security lead's iPhone 16 Pro at Hangzhou headquarters.

3月10日，厂商的最终答复："经过我们安全工程师审核，这些属于正常功能。" March 10, the vendor's final response: "Based on our security engineers' assessment, these constitute normal functionality."

第二部分 Part 2 审查升级：从驳回到全面删除 Escalating Censorship — From Rejection to Total Deletion

时间线本身就是最有力的证据。 The timeline itself is the most powerful evidence.

被删除的9篇文章 The 9 Deleted Articles

1. 《当白名单绕过沦为全网攻击的钥匙，傲慢的终点是法庭与溯源调查》"When Whitelist Bypass Becomes the Master Key to Full-Network Attack"
2. 《巨头的"封口令"被微信驳回，而全球顶级黑客弹药库给出了最终裁决》"Tech Giant's 'Gag Order' Rejected by WeChat, Packet Storm Delivers Final Verdict"
3. 《位置被秒偷！10多亿人每天在用的国民支付应用，17个「正常功能」细思极恐！》"Location Stolen Instantly! 17 'Normal Features' in the App 1 Billion People Use Daily"
4. 《支付宝安全研究遭律师函投诉——一篇零次提及"支付宝"的文章如何构成"商誉侵权"？》"Alipay Research Hit with Lawyer's Letter — How Does an Article That Never Mentions 'Alipay' Constitute Reputation Infringement?"
5. WAVE 2 (March 20):
6. 《支付宝公关忙着删帖，我已经发论文拿到了全球最顶级密码学的入场券》"While Alipay's PR Team Deletes Posts, I've Published a Paper Accepted by the World's Top Cryptography Archive"
7. 《竞品监控还是用户监控？支付宝代码里暗藏1095个APP"监控名单"：你装的微信、银行、京东，它全知道》"Competitor Surveillance or User Surveillance? 1095 Apps in Alipay's Hidden Monitoring List"
8. 《我以中国公民身份，向网信办正式举报了支付宝》"As a Chinese Citizen, I Formally Reported Alipay to the Cyberspace Administration of China"
9. 《支付宝需要监控你的截屏、蓝牙和通话吗？一次完整的逆向工程分析》"Does Alipay Need to Monitor Your Screenshots, Bluetooth, and Phone Calls? A Complete Reverse Engineering Analysis"
10. WAVE 3 (March 25):
11. 《支付宝146,173个方法可被远程替换——PatchProxy热修复的代码级铁证》"Alipay's 146,173 Remotely Replaceable Methods — PatchProxy Hot-Patching Code-Level Evidence"

删除通知截图（原始证据） Deletion Notice Screenshots (Original Evidence)

微信公众平台安全助手通知 — 文章1和2 WeChat Platform Safety Assistant — Articles 1 and 2

微信公众平台安全助手通知 — 文章3和4 WeChat Platform Safety Assistant — Articles 3 and 4

第三波删除通知截图 (3月25日) Wave 3 Deletion Notice Screenshot (March 25)

微信公众平台安全助手通知 — Vol.04 PatchProxy (第9篇) WeChat Platform Safety Assistant — Vol.04 PatchProxy (Article #9)

第二波删除通知截图 (3月20日) Wave 2 Deletion Notice Screenshots (March 20)

第二波删除通知 — 文章5和6 (IACR论文 + 1095个APP监控名单) Wave 2 Deletion Notice — Articles 5 and 6 (IACR Paper + 1095-App Surveillance List)

第二波删除通知 — 文章7和8 (向网信办举报 + 逆向工程分析) Wave 2 Deletion Notice — Articles 7 and 8 (CAC Complaint + Reverse Engineering Analysis)

升级路径清晰可见： The escalation pattern is unmistakable:

口头否认漏洞 → 律师函投诉"名誉侵权"（被驳回）→ 改用"网络安全法"（第一波：删4篇）→ 研究员继续发表 → 再次删除（第二波：再删4篇）→ 网信办核查同日再删1篇（第三波）→ 服务器端拦截PoC Verbal denial → Lawyer letter citing "reputation infringement" (rejected) → Switch to "Cybersecurity Law" (Wave 1: 4 articles deleted) → Researcher continues publishing → Second deletion (Wave 2: 4 more deleted) → CAC investigation same day, 1 more deleted (Wave 3) → Server-side PoC interception

第三部分 Part 3 法律的两张面孔 Two Faces of Law

中国：网络安全法的武器化 China: Weaponization of Cybersecurity Law

2026年1月1日生效的《网络安全法》修正案将原第26条改为第28条，规定：未经授权开展网络安全认证、检测、风险评估活动，或发布系统漏洞等网络安全信息，可被处以最高100万元人民币罚款（约14万美元），并可被责令停业整顿、关闭网站、吊销营业执照。 China's amended Cybersecurity Law (effective January 1, 2026) renumbered Article 26 to Article 28, stipulating: conducting unauthorized cybersecurity certification, testing, or risk assessment, or publishing cybersecurity information including system vulnerabilities, may result in fines up to RMB 1 million (~$140,000 USD), with authorities empowered to order business suspension, website shutdown, or license revocation.

在本案中：In this case:

• 研究者在公开前已经提交了4轮私密报告和23分钟电话沟通The researcher submitted 4 rounds of private reports and 23 minutes of phone calls before public disclosure
• 厂商明确拒绝承认漏洞（"正常功能"）The vendor explicitly refused to acknowledge the vulnerabilities ("normal functionality")
• 微信平台自己审核后认为不构成侵权WeChat's own review found no infringement
• 相同的技术内容在 Packet Storm、GitHub、innora.ai 上合法存在Identical technical content exists lawfully on Packet Storm, GitHub, and innora.ai

网络安全法第28条不适用于此场景。它被用来作为一个无法被质疑的"核武器"——因为在中国的平台审核体系中，引用"网络安全法"几乎等于自动执行，无需实质审查。 Article 28 does not apply to this scenario. It was wielded as an unquestionable "nuclear option" — because in China's platform moderation system, invoking "Cybersecurity Law" triggers near-automatic enforcement without substantive review.

欧盟：吹哨人保护指令 EU: Whistleblower Protection Directive

在世界的另一边，完全相反的法律框架保护着同样的行为。 On the other side of the world, an entirely opposite legal framework protects the exact same conduct.

Alipay的欧洲实体——Alipay (Europe) Limited S.A.（CSSF编号W000****09，卢森堡RCS B188095）——持有电子货币机构(EMI)牌照，受CSSF直接监管。 Alipay's European entity — Alipay (Europe) Limited S.A. (CSSF No. W000****09, Luxembourg RCS B188095) — holds an Electronic Money Institution (EMI) license under direct CSSF supervision.

2025年5月，CSSF已经因反洗钱(AML)违规对其处以€214,000罚款——涉及6起可疑交易报告未提交、制裁警报延迟、KYC文件缺失。 In May 2025, CSSF had already fined it €214,000 for AML violations — involving 6 unreported suspicious transaction reports, delayed sanction alerts, and missing KYC documentation.

2026年3月13日，我向CSSF Whistleblowing团队提交了安全漏洞报告。案件编号：[Case Ref Redacted]。CSSF的ICT Risk监管部门和Whistleblowing团队双重确认收到。 On March 13, 2026, I submitted the security vulnerability report to CSSF's Whistleblowing team. Case number: [Case Ref Redacted]. Both CSSF's ICT Risk Supervision and Whistleblowing teams confirmed receipt.

第四部分 Part 4 全球回响：38个机构的回答 Global Echo — Responses from 38 Institutions

如果这些漏洞真的是"正常功能"，为什么全球38个机构做出了回应？ If these vulnerabilities are truly "normal functionality," why did 38 global institutions respond?

金融监管机构（16个回复） Financial Regulators (16 responses)

平台方（5个回复） Platforms (5 responses)

媒体与社区（7+个回复） Media and Community (7+ responses)

Help Net Security、Tech in Asia、The Information等媒体确认收到。Reddit r/netsec社区已发帖。独立安全研究者在GitHub上独立复现了发现。 Help Net Security, Tech in Asia, The Information and others confirmed receipt. Posted on Reddit r/netsec. Independent security researchers reproduced findings on GitHub.

第五部分 Part 5 全球模式：安全研究者被打压不是个案 Global Pattern — Researcher Suppression Is Not Isolated

disclose.io Research Threats Database 记录了过去25年中 80+起安全研究者遭受法律威胁的案例。模式惊人地相似： The disclose.io Research Threats Database documents 80+ cases of legal threats against security researchers over 25 years. The patterns are strikingly similar:

不管是谁提交的第二次投诉，结果都一样恐怖：一次被驳回的投诉，只需要换一个法律依据就能绕过平台审核，实现内容删除。这个系统没有纠错机制。 Regardless of who filed the second complaint, the result is equally terrifying: a rejected complaint can bypass platform review simply by citing a different legal basis, achieving content deletion. This system has no error-correction mechanism.

第六部分 Part 6 对比的荒谬 The Absurdity of Contrast

同一份技术研究报告。同样的17个漏洞。同样的308条日志和42张截图。 The same technical research report. The same 17 vulnerabilities. The same 308 logs and 42 screenshots.

第七部分 Part 7 寒蝉效应与真正的网络安全威胁 Chilling Effect and the Real Cybersecurity Threat

删除安全研究文章不会让漏洞消失。 Deleting security research articles does not make vulnerabilities disappear.

截至今天，这条CVSS 9.3的攻击链仍然公开存档在三个独立节点： As of today, this CVSS 9.3 attack chain remains publicly archived on three independent nodes:

删除微信文章唯一的效果是：让中国用户无法了解他们正在使用的应用存在的安全风险。 The only effect of deleting WeChat articles: Chinese users are denied knowledge of the security risks in the application they use daily.

删除通知截图（原始证据） Deletion Notice Screenshots (Original Evidence)

微信公众平台安全助手通知 — 文章1和2 WeChat Platform Safety Assistant — Articles 1 and 2

微信公众平台安全助手通知 — 文章3和4 WeChat Platform Safety Assistant — Articles 3 and 4

第八部分 Part 8 我们的立场 Our Position

我以CISSP认证安全专家的身份，以Innora AI安全研究团队创始人的身份，声明以下立场： As a CISSP-certified security professional and founder of Innora AI Security Research, I state the following position:

• 1

  我们遵循了负责任披露的每一个步骤We followed every step of responsible disclosure

  4轮私密报告、23分钟电话沟通、等待厂商回应，所有步骤均符合 ISO/IEC 29147:2018 标准。4 rounds of private reporting, 23-minute phone discussion, waiting for vendor response — all compliant with ISO/IEC 29147:2018.

• 2

  厂商明确拒绝承认漏洞The vendor explicitly refused to acknowledge vulnerabilities

  将CVSS 9.3的攻击链定性为"正常功能"，不修复、不通知用户。Classifying a CVSS 9.3 attack chain as "normal functionality," with no fix and no user notification.

• 3

  公开披露是在穷尽所有私密渠道后的最后手段Public disclosure was a last resort after exhausting all private channels

  这也是ISO 29147标准所允许的。As permitted by ISO 29147.

• 4

  41个国际机构的回应验证了我们研究的价值和合法性41 international institutions' responses validate our research's value and legitimacy

• 5

  利用法律删除安全研究不会让漏洞消失Using law to delete security research does not make vulnerabilities disappear

  它只会让用户更加脆弱。It only makes users more vulnerable.

• 6

  我们将继续配合所有监管机构的调查We will continue cooperating with all regulatory investigations

  包括HKMA、PDPC、CSSF、FCA、OAIC、Apple和Google的调查。Including HKMA, PDPC, CSSF, FCA, OAIC, Apple, and Google.

第九部分 Part 9 致全球安全研究社区 To the Global Security Research Community

这不仅仅是一个关于支付宝漏洞的故事。这是一个关于安全研究者在2026年面临的系统性威胁的故事。 This is not merely a story about Alipay vulnerabilities. This is a story about the systemic threats security researchers face in 2026.

我们需要：We need:

• 全球统一的安全研究者保护框架A globally unified researcher protection framework — 不只是EU的Directive 2019/1937，而是全球适用的Safe Harbor not just EU's Directive 2019/1937, but a universally applicable Safe Harbor
• 平台审核的独立性保障Platform moderation independence — 当法律条款被武器化时，平台不应成为审查的执行者 when legal provisions are weaponized, platforms should not become censorship executors
• 跨境报复行为的问责机制Accountability for cross-border retaliation — 在EU有吹哨人保护的实体，不应能在中国平台上实施报复 entities protected by EU whistleblower laws should not be able to retaliate on Chinese platforms

附录 Appendix 关键案件编号 Key Case Numbers